Irina Pirogova

Story

The scammer presents herself as Irina Pirogova, a young blonde woman from Lebedyn in the Sumy region, claiming to work as a cook in a café. To appear genuine and trustworthy, she uses a collection of polished, model-like photos taken in gardens, cafés, and in stylish dresses. She also sends an image of a Ukrainian international passport under the name IRINA PIROGOVA. Her Telegram profile appears under @iri2806, she communicates through calls and messages, and she uses the Ukrainian phone number +380 99 847 82 03. Her polite and friendly tone on the phone helps lower suspicion and creates the impression of honesty — a technique commonly used in online romance fraud to disarm the victim. After weeks of steady communication, she proposes meeting in Warsaw and gradually shifts the conversation toward money. Her first request is 300 euros “for the trip,” which the man sends through PayPal. During the transaction, he notices that the payment does not go to Irina but to another name: Nataliia Azarina. She explains this by saying it is “her sister’s account.” The PayPal address involved is ppay89688@gmail.com. She also mentions this “sister” in conversations and photos to reinforce the illusion of a normal family backdrop. As the supposed meeting date approaches, she claims she visited a travel agency (without giving its name) and was informed that she must carry at least 200 euros in cash to cross the border from Ukraine to Poland. She references real border-control rules regarding minimum financial means to make her request sound legitimate. She insists she cannot leave Ukraine without this amount and pressures him to send the money urgently, saying she is “leaving tomorrow morning.” When asked for a picture of her travel ticket, she replies that it is “electronic only” and cannot be photographed — an obvious red flag. This pattern represents a typical Ukrainian romance scam: attractive or stolen photos, intensive and emotional conversation, a supposed Ukrainian passport as proof of identity, an initial money transfer to a third-party account, and then an urgent second payment tied to a fabricated travel requirement. Once the money is sent, the meeting in Warsaw becomes extremely unlikely, leaving the victim alone abroad with lost funds and no real person behind the promises.